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ABSTRACT. An agent who desires, ceteris paribus, to maximise her true beliefs and minimise her false beliefs will
be rational if she pays due attention to the question of bias when appraising the testimony of others, since bias may
cause a testifier to say things which are not true. But how much is “due”? According to the genetic fallacy, it does
not follow deductively that testimony is false because it is biased. However, Alvin Goldman and Wesley Salmon
have argued that where an testifier has historically made false claims due to bias, this is good probabilistic evidence
to think her future (biased) claims false as well. And Elliot Sober argues that if the cause of a belief is independent
from the grounds of its truth, this is a good probabilistic reason to count the belief false. I contend to the contrary
that genetic arguments (with very rare exceptions) do not offer even probabilistic reasons for disbelief or even
agnosticism about claims supported by biased testimony, and I offer a Bayesian analysis of Sober’s arguments as
well as intuitively plausible arguments to support my claim. Moreover, “independence,” as Sober defines it, is
neither a necessary or sufficient condition to support inductively compelling genetic arguments.
Annette Baier, on the other hand, has suggested that recognizing genetic arguments as fallacious requires us to
“ignore” the origins of ideas. I show that this interpretation is also mistaken. I offer some suggestions on when and
where attributions of bias will be helpful, and I rely on robust, well-confirmed, and widely-observed psychological
phenomena in group psychology to suggest that suggestions of bias, even where true, will very frequently reduce,
rather than increase, an agent’s epistemic success.

One reason why we might aspire to a value-free science is that some values - call them
“biases” - will unacceptably influence the way scientists frame scientific questions, select,
interpret, and reject data, devise methodologies, and formulate explanations. Since theories are
always underdetermined by observation, observer bias will fill the epistemic gap and create
observer-relative theories. In short, bias can taint an entire scientific enterprise with nonobjectivity. Following Robert Nozick, let us call this the Contamination Thesis (Nozick 1997,
34). It is now tempting to suggest that that if some theory Q is tainted by bias, that fact will count
as a reason to think that Q is false. If we combine the Contamination Thesis with the further
claims that (1) bias is endemic to some research tradition and (2) that this bias is the chief causal
force behind theory construction, promulgation, and acceptance within that tradition, we now
have a powerful conceptual tool with which to reject entire research traditions.
However, the Contamination Thesis is not sufficient to establish that a theory is false.
Practical logic warns us that genetic arguments such as these are invalid and fallacious since
even apparently disreputable origins can yield true claims (Copi 1996, 121-2). But there are at
least three suggestions that this is not the whole story.
1) Lorraine Code points out that there is a curious asymmetry between the way we
consider appeals to authority and the way we treat genetic arguments (Code
1993, 27). To paraphrase Code slightly, if an unbiased and credible authority
utters some claim P, we typically count this as a good probabilistic reason to
think that P is true. By parity of reason then, if a biased and therefore noncredible source utters Q, this ought to be a good probabilistic reason to think that
Q is false. In other words, genetic arguments are (or ought to be) the epistemic
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mirrors of appeals to authority. Of course, in saying this, Code is in no way
arguing that all appeal to authority or genetic arguments are legitimate.
2) Alvin Goldman, following Wesley Salmon, also argues for parallelism between
appeals to authority and genetic arguments if those arguments are based on an
agent’s epistemic history. Suppose an agent makes some set of claims about
subject S and the great majority of these claims prove false. If the agent makes
some further claim Q about S, Goldman claims it is then simply a matter of
“proper induction” to conclude that Q is false as well (Goldman 1999, 152-3).
3) Elliot Sober has argued that insofar as an agent’s belief is independent of the
truth of the belief, it is for that reason likely to be false. Given these
considerations, it seems that a probabilistic version of the genetic argument may
be acceptable where a deductive version is not.
I contend to the contrary that both the “hard” (deductive) and “soft” (probabilistic) variants
of the genetic argument are flawed. Except for some exceedingly rare cases that I’ll discuss later,
evidence of human bias is never a good reason to think a claim is false. I shall use Bayes’ Rule
and intuitively acceptable arguments to show that Sober’s argument is mistaken and shall offer
some normative suggestions about the epistemic value of genetic arguments.
Sober’s Probabilistic Genetic Argument
Sober argues that even though deductive forms of the genetic argument are indeed invalid,
this point has been over-interpreted (Sober 1993, 206; 1994, 105). There are, he argues, perfectly
respectable probabilistic versions of the genetic argument. Sober offers this thought experiment,
which he directs against a variant of subjectivist ethics, but which is more applicable:
Suppose I walk into my introduction to philosophy class one day with the idea that I will
decide how many people are in the room by drawing a slip of paper from an urn. In the urn
are a hundred such slips, each with a different number written on it. I reach in the urn, draw
a slip that says “78,” and announce that I believe that exactly 78 people are present. (206)

Since Sober’s belief is almost certainly incorrect, Sober thinks we can construct the
following genetic argument:
(1) Sober decided that there were 78 people in the room by drawing the number 78 at
random from an urn.
p ============================
It isn't true that there are 78 people in the room.

The “p” and double line indicate that the argument is non-deductive and that the premise
confers probability p on the conclusion. Sober contends that p is high and that this is “a perfectly
sensible genetic argument” in which “the conclusion is justified because of the process that led
me to this belief (Sober 1993, 206, emphasis added)” even though “what caused me to reach the
belief had nothing whatever to do with whether the belief is true (Sober 1993, 207,
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emphasis in original).” By way of contrast, if Sober’s alter ego Rebos carefully counts all the
people in the class and consequently believes there are 104 people present, we have good
probabilistic grounds to think that Rebos is right, because she arrived at her belief in a
respectable way.
Sober’s moral is this: where an independence relation holds between a belief’s cause and the
truth of the belief, the belief is likely false. Contrariwise, if there is a dependence relation
between the belief’s cause and its truth, the belief is likely to be true. So this example proves that
genetic arguments can offer probabilistic grounds to think some claims are false (Sober 1993,
207). This interpretation looks intuitively compelling, but I think it’s incorrect, and Bayes’ Rule
demonstrates this conclusively. According to the simplified version of Bayes’ Rule:
(2) P(Q|R) = (P(Q) X P(R|Q))/P(R)

where:
Q = There are exactly 78 people in the class.
P(Q) = The probability that (Q)
R = Sober randomly draws the number 78.
P(R) = The probability that (R) = 1/100
P (Q|R) = The probability that there are exactly 78 people in the class conditional on the fact
that Sober randomly draws the number 78.
P (R|Q) = The likelihood that Sober draws 78 conditional on the fact that there are exactly 78
people in the class. R and Q are independent, so P (R) = 1/100.

Substituting these values in (2) yields
(3) P(Q|R) = (P(Q) X 1/100)/(1/100)

which simplifies to:
(4) P(Q|R) = P(Q)

In other words, the probability of there being 78 people in the room given that Sober drew 78
from the urn is exactly equal to the prior probability that there are 78 people in the room.
Therefore Sober’s conclusion that there are exactly 78 people in the room is probably false just
in case we think P (Q) is small. But Sober’s argument (1) offers no evidence whatsoever that P
(Q) is small. This suggests that the argument relies crucially on a suppressed premise:
(5) Sober decided that there were 78 people in the room by drawing the number 78 at
random from an urn.
[University classes rarely contain exactly 78 people.]
p ============================
It isn't true that there are 78 people in the room.

Making this suppressed premise explicit shows that it, and not Sober’s independence thesis, is in
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fact doing all the evidential work. If you doubt this, consider these two variants of Sober’s
argument:
(6) Sober decided that there were 78 people in the room by drawing the number 77 at
random from an urn.
[University classes rarely contain exactly 78 people.]
p ============================
It isn't true that there are 78 people in the room.
(7) Sober decided that there were 78 people in the room by drawing the number
78 at random from an urn.
[Universities rigidly enforce rules requiring there to be exactly 78 people in every class.]
p ============================
It is true that there are 78 people in the room.

Now let me make the disagreement between Sober and me as explicit as possible. Sober
thinks that:
(8) “drawing 78 at random” and believing that “there are 78 people in the class” are two
independent states of affairs.
______________________________________________
(1) is a “convincing” argument (Sober 1993, 207).

While I contend that
(9) “drawing 78 at random” and believing that “there are 78 people in the class” are two
independent states of affairs.
_____________________________________________
(1) is a weak argument.
(2)

I want now to diagnose just why we disagree. Consider for a moment the following matrix:
INDEPENDENT
BELIEF FORMATION:
Sober draws the number 78
from an urn and
consequently …

DEPENDENT BELIEF
FORMATION: Rebos
carefully counts the people
in the room and
consequently …
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YIELDS TRUE
BELIEF (PROBABLY)

EMPIRICISM: Rebos
POINTLESS RANDOM
CHOICE: Sober believes there believes there are 104 people
in the room.
are NOT 78 people in the
room.

YIELDS FALSE
BELIEF (PROBABLY

RANDOM CHOICE:
Sober believes there are 78
people in the room.

PERVERSE
EMPIRICISM: Rebos believes
there are NOT 104 people in
the room.

In the first column, the cause of both of Sober’s beliefs is independent of the facts. But the
belief generated by Pointless Random Choice in the upper square is almost certainly true. Hence
it is false to say that the independence relation cannot reliably produce true beliefs. The lower
right hand corner represents beliefs formed by Perverse Empiricism. A Perverse Empiricist
believes some claim Q iff she has carefully investigated Q and found compelling evidence that Q
is false. Hence her beliefs are dependent on the truth, but, so to speak, inversely so. This is the
only case in which a genetic argument has any force. Precisely because we know the Perverse
Empiricist’s epistemic practices reliably create false beliefs, appeals to those origins count
legitimately as a reason not to think her claims false. So, properly considered, the argument from
authority and the genetic argument are indeed analogous. One can, for example, infer that a
given measurement is inaccurate if one knows that the measuring instrument that produced it
reliably measures too high or too low. But because human Perverse Empiricism is pathological,
rare, and largely irrelevant to scientific study, I will henceforth disregard it.
Sober only considers the beliefs represented by the lower left hand and upper right hand
boxes. This, I suggest, is why he thinks that a belief’s plausibility is linked to its dependence. But
the examples of Pointless Random Choice and Perverse Empiricism prove that dependence is
neither necessary nor sufficient for true belief. We also need to recognise that Sober’s example
also fails (no doubt for the sake of lucid exposition) to model real world belief formation
procedures where degrees of epistemic in/dependence are far more difficult to ascertain and
where prior probabilities may not be so obviously minuscule.
If my line of reasoning is correct, Sober has given us no reason to think that the origins of a
belief will count as reasons to think that it is false - even where those beliefs are arrived on the
basis of random choice. Goldman’s contention that one can make a persuasive inductive
argument from an agent’s past false claims fares no better. Suppose Jones makes a set of false
claims {A ...P} about subject S. If Jones further asserts claim Q about S, isn’t her espousal of the
earlier set of false claims a good reason to think that Q is also false? No. If there is some direct
logical or evidential link between {A ...P} and Q such that the falsity of the former is evidence
for the falsity of Q, then you have good reason to think Q is false independently of Jones’s
actually asserting Q. For example, if Q entails {A … P}, then Q must be false. On the other
hand, if Q is logically independent of the former discredited claims, then its probability cannot
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be less than its probability prior to Jones asserting it, and this follows for precisely the same
reasons I adumbrated above against Sober’s example. In neither case is the shared origin of
claims {A...P} and Q relevant to our evaluation of Q’s truth-value.
Bias and Probability
Evidence of bias is thus never, all by itself, a reason to disbelieve any claim Q. And if the
prior probability of Q is high, it may not even be reason to be agnostic about Q. For my purposes
here, I define “agnostic” as having no reason to prefer one truth-value over another for some
claim. Formally, the agent might say she assigns a probability of 0.5 to that claim. But it is
probably more common that she is unwilling to be so precise. In these cases, it is sufficient for
my purposes that the agent be much more willing to accept a probability close to 0.5 than she is
to accept a probability of 1 or 0. Now consider the case in which exactly one of four theories [A,
B, C, D] is true, and one has no reason to prefer any of them (i.e., P(A) = P(B) = P(C) = P(D)).
The prior probability of not-C is therefore 0.75. Later evidence might increase one’s belief in
not-C, but if this evidence turns out to be biased, one is still justified in assigning not-C a
relatively high level of probability (0.75).
Nonetheless, it is straightforwardly false to assert, as Annette Baier does, that arguments
against genetic arguments require us to “ignore” Q’s origins as irrelevant (Baier 1995, 325).
After all, in many cases, knowing that Q comes from unsavoury origins will be good reason not
to increase one’s degree of assent. But this will only be the case where a testifier is strongly
towards Q. Where an agent is only weakly biased towards Q, it may be rational to increase one’s
belief in Q even though one knows that the testimony for Q is biased. Consider, for example the
testimony of two chicken sexers. One is strongly male-biased- she identifies all chickens as male.
The other is only weakly pro-male in her assessments - she correctly identifies all male chicks as
male, and misidentifies only 1% of female chicks as female. It is therefore rational to believe the
testimony of the latter (and to believe it to a high degree) - even though we know her testimony
to be biased.
So a rational agent who desires to maximise her quotient of true (or justified) beliefs over
false beliefs will be acting in an epistemically responsible manner if she takes credible
accusations of bias seriously. I offer some modest suggestions about how she should do this.
First, it is tempting to believe that if a scientific claim Q has a low prior probability, one can
therefore infer the likely existence and influence of bias in its creation. Given this, one can next
deduce the nature of that bias from the content of Q itself, and this inference can then be used to
erect a genetic argument against the veracity of Q. (Lorraine Code’s dialogical epistemology
apparently licences this methodology. Code employs this form of argument against Philippe
Rushton, who has argued (notoriously) that there is an interracial correlation between penis size
and intelligence. Code contends that since Rushton could not have found his data “by
coincidence,” he must therefore have been driven by some right-wing agenda. Code proceeds to
lay out in detail what Rushton’s politics must be, and then suggests that the existence of these
politics constitutes a probabilistic reason to reject Rushton’s work (Code 1993, 28-9). This
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tempting conclusion, however, rests on a false dilemma, since there is any number of
motivations that could have informed Rushton’s research.)
This practice is, however, deeply flawed for several reasons. First, the existence of bias or
error will not be revealed in the prior probability of Q itself, but in the conditional prior
probability of an agent’s asserting Q given that Q is in fact true (Nozick 1993, 101). Let me
explain this a bit. If, for example, one knows that Q is false, one might guess which biases might
have led a researcher to espouse it. Contrariwise, if one knows that a researcher has a given set of
non-scientific commitments, one might guess how those commitments would affect her work.
But both of these approaches are very dodgy enterprises, since there are any number of nonscientific considerations that might have motivated a researcher, and since a researcher’s
political and moral commitments do not exert a deterministic influence on her scientific claims.
After all, people frequently do arrive at counterattitudinal beliefs (Goldman 1999, 236). Now
consider the case in which one knows neither that Q is false nor that bias played a role in Q’s
construction. In this case, to infer the existence of bias from the content of Q and to then argue
that that bias now counts against the truth of Q is surely to build epistemic castles in the air. And,
as the Bayesian argument above shows, erecting probabilistic arguments against Q that are based
on Q’s own low prior probability will lead to double discounting. So, to avoid these evils, claims
that a researcher is biased should be based on independent evidence about the researcher’s nonscientific commitments.
Some science critics, (Rose 1984, 8) for example, have assumed that this measure is
sufficient all by itself: prove that a scientist has a given political commitment and you’ve proved
that it also adversely affects her research. But whether this is so is an empirical question, and
must be settled by empirical means. Alvin Goldman argues that several flaws hamper many case
studies on scientific bias. First, studies that show that political interests are coincident with claim
Q cannot, by their very nature, establish the counterfactual condition that had those political facts
not obtained, the claim Q would not have been made. Such case studies therefore cannot
establish the causal efficacy of politics on the development of Q. And even where they do, they
are less persuasive in explaining Q’s continued acceptance. Finally, Goldman suspects, many
case studies are not undertaken on a random or representative set of scientific episodes, but are
handpicked to prove the very points which science critics wish to make (Goldman 1999, 37-40).
Consequently, these case studies cannot be used to licence generalisations about the effect of
bias across all science. Given all this, it seems that the best way to conclusively prove that bias
has led a researcher astray is to show first that she did go astray, and then to show that bias was
the cause. But where this can be done, one of course no longer needs a genetic argument.
Furthermore, Robert Nozick has argued that no factor is intrinsically biasing and that
whether or not a factor biases epistemic products depends crucially on the process in which it
occurs. For example, although jurors are supposed to be unbiased, it may well be that a jury with
two biased and opposed jurors will more frequently arrive at the truth - and this, again, is an
empirical question (Nozick 1993, 33-4). And an example drawn from Donald Brown suggests
that political bias can in some cases increase a researcher’s credibility. If, for example, feminist
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anthropologists have political interests in discovering evidence of ancestral matriarchies, then
when feminist anthropologists such as Pam Bamberger and Sherry Ortner fail to find any such
evidence, this is particularly persuasive in showing that matriarchies did not in fact exist (Brown
1991, 52).
All this aside, one might still think that an awareness of bias cannot help but improve one’s
critical objectivity, especially when one cannot assign any prior probability to Q. My final point
suggests that this may not be so. To see why, notice first that attributions of bias are frequently
made in the third person. You and I, gentle listener, have our commitments. They have biases.
We have intuitions. They have prejudices. Notice also that accusations of bias are commonly
made on the basis of some difference between us and them. That is, if I warn you about Jones’
dualist, anti-feminist, or reductionist bias, I typically do so in the belief that you and I are not
dualists, anti-feminists, or reductionists. So when I ascribe bias to some third party, this
accusation will frequently elicit in my listener what social psychologists call ingroup/outgroup
bias (Tyler 1999, 2-3). This well-known and pronounced bias displays three relevant features:
The Minimal Group Paradigm: The listener will display bias against the outgroup even
when she knows the differences between groups are minimal. Investigators have found
that members of one group will discriminate against another group even when they know
that the groups have been divided on the basis of such irrelevant criteria as a coin toss or
differing preferences in modern art.
Outgroup Derogation: The listener will tend to favor the ingroup over the outgroup and
will attribute more negative attributes to the outgroup. In this vein, Sandra Harding
attributes the numerous failures of mainstream science and the many epistemic successes
of marginalised knowers to the fact that marginalised knowers can somehow throw off
their “covers and blinders” and thereby understand the world “how in fact it is” while
scientists are “destined” to study not nature itself, but only “socially constituted objects
(Harding 1993, 54, 64).”
Stereotyping: The listener will tend to believe that there is far less intragroup diversity
within the outgroup than within the ingroup. Val Dusek, for example, flatly asserts that
“Certainly none of the evolutionary psychologists support major egalitarian change in
social or gender arrangements (Dusek 1999).”

Ingroup/outgroup bias is a robust, widespread, and highly confirmed phenomenon and it is
almost impossible to overestimate its effect on our epistemic practices. If this model is correct,
the mere suggestion that some theory Q serves some pernicious social function, or is situated
within some noxious political nexus, or is the product of an oppressive power structure, et cetera,
will thereby condemn Q as the doctrine of outgroup members whose beliefs have irredeemably
contaminated their scientific understanding. Notice that the very rhetoric of “contamination”
supports the gratuitous assumption that it is only ideologies that we find repugnant that could
contaminate science. If, for example, one were a liberal, one would hardly say that Jones’ liberal
commitments had “contaminated” her scientific views. And the claim of “contamination” further
implies - again gratuitously – that the degree of bias is absolute and total, where in fact only a
slight bias may be present. (It is incoherent to suggest that a research program is
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“contaminated” with political bias and then to suggest that its testimony is still somewhat
credible.) And the assumption that all bias contaminates completely invites the further gratuitous
conclusion that if there is a political cause for believing Q, there is therefore no epistemic reason
to believe it. Even worse, such accusations will prevent us from seriously considering Q, because
serious consideration of Q implies the possibility of conversion, and if the group bias theory is
correct, many of us will fear conversion to outgroup beliefs more than we fear error.
If group bias effect is universal, powerful, and anti-veritistic, nostrums counseling openmindedness are simply not sufficient. Rather, we should take care to construct arguments in ways
that do not trigger well-known epistemic failings (such as group bias) in our listeners. Paul
Viminitz suggests (p.c., 2000) that the naturalised epistemologist can reasonably object that
group bias is an epistemic pattern that must be doing some useful work for us. And my concerns
about the argument from bias apply with equal force against my own appeal to group bias. That
said, I am not certain that arguments which rely, even implicitly, on group bias are, on the whole,
epistemically advantageous within modern science. My intent here has been neither to trivialise
the role of bias nor to counsel quietism. Rather, my modest suggestion is that accusations of bias
may be incapable of bearing the entire epistemic load that they are sometimes asked to support.
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